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Non-technical summary 
 
In criticising of the conventional wisdom -- the Washington Consensus -- Guillermo 
Calvo of Inter-American Development Bank argues that emerging market finance is 
subject to market failures with potentially disastrous consequences. At the UTDT 
summer workshop in Buenos Aires in August 2002, indeed, he proposed that whether 
or not a theory of sovereign debt crisis includes ‘sudden stops’ should be a crucial test 
of its empirical relevance for emerging market finance, see Calvo et al (2002). In his 
recent book on the international monetary system, Tirole (2002, p. ix-x) evidently 
takes much the same perspective: the first chapter begins by referring to the wide 
consensus that has emerged among economists that “capital account liberalisation ... 
was unambiguously good. Good for the debtor countries, good for the world 
economy” ; but it continues with the warning that “(this) consensus has been shattered 
lately. A number of capital account liberalizations have been followed by spectacular 
foreign exchange and banking crises.” 
 
Following Russia’s partial foreign debt repudiation in August 1998, for instance, 
generous inflows to Latin America came to a standstill; and sovereign interest rate 
spreads rose to over 1600 basis points on the Emerging Market Bond index (EMBI+). 
These developments -- together with the collapsing currencies and soaring sovereign 
spreads facing many Latin American countries in 2001/2 -- have put in question 
traditional explanations for financial crises, based on current account and fiscal 
deficits. They suggest the need to analyse the intrinsic behaviour of capital markets.
  
The focus of this paper is on how problems of creditor co-ordination interact with 
debtor's incentives to generate excessive crises. In the academic literature, these issues 
are typically treated separately. In explaining ‘bank runs’, for example, the classic 
paper by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) demonstrates the possibility of multiple 
equilibria in financial markets, but takes as given the structure of demand deposit 
contracts ( i.e. the right of depositors to withdraw on demand) and the choice of 
investments by the bank. To help select the ‘good’ equilibrium, three institutional 
mechanisms were discussed -- provision of liquidity, suspension of convertibility and 
deposit insurance. Analogous co-ordination problems arise in connection with 
emerging-market bonds and similar proposals have recently been made with respect 
to sovereign debt. Stanley Fischer (1999), Radelet and Sachs (1998) and Truman 
(2001), for example, have emphasised official provision of liquidity; while Krugman 
(1998) called for capital outflow controls to protect East Asian currencies (i.e. a 
suspension of convertibility). There has not been much talk of explicit insurance, 
Soros (1998) and Jeanne (2001) being exceptions: but an additional possibility has 
been widely discussed, that of revising the nature of sovereign debt contracts 
themselves. Eichengreen and Portes (1995), Buchheit and Gulati (2000) and Taylor 
(2002) have advocated the insertion of collective action clauses to assist creditor co-
ordination. 
 
Proposals like these, designed to solve creditor coordination problems, have been 
criticised for failing to take into account their effect on sovereign debtors' incentives. 
Barro (1998, p.18), for example, suggested that bail-outs can increase the probability 
of sovereign default, stating that “bailouts increase ‘moral hazard’ by rewarding and 
encouraging bad policies by governments and excessive risk-taking by banks”. With 
reference to $42 billion support package for Brazil in 1998, for example, Barro asked: 
“How did the Brazilians qualify for this support? They did so mostly by not 
exercising sound fiscal policies. If their policies had been better, they would not be in 
their current difficulties and would not qualify for IMF money”. After further 
discussion of the bailouts for Mexico and Russia, he concluded “the IMF might 
consider changing its name to the IMH-- the Institute for Moral Hazard”. 
 
Typically, debtor's moral hazard has been considered in a separate strand of the 
literature which focuses on the use of punishment strategies in models of repeated 
interaction. In Bulow and Rogoff (1989a), for example, trade sanctions are the 
punishment mechanism to prevent strategic default. But since their bargaining model 
assumes a single creditor lending to a single debtor, creditor coordination problems 
are not discussed. Nor are they addressed in Kletzer and Wright (2000), who use a 
repeated game model to study how restricting access to capital markets can check 
moral hazard. 
 
A convincing treatment of sovereign debt crises and their resolution needs to combine 
creditor co-ordination and debtor incentives in a consistent framework. This paper 
develops such a framework.  
 
To set the scene, we first describe the two principal proposals for improving the 
international financial architecture currently under active consideration, the Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) advocated by the IMF and the Collective 
Action Clauses recommended by the US Treasury.  
 
The analysis proper begins follows with a canonical two-player game of “creditor 
coordination” where neither creditor can make a credible commitment not to quit 
where there is a default, even when shocks are temporary. This co-ordination game 
has three Nash equilibria: two in pure strategies (stay, stay) and (quit, quit), and a 
third in mixed strategies. Solving creditor co-ordination problems in sovereign bond 
markets is, however, subject to a moral hazard constraint: that debtors must retain the 
incentive to service their debts. In this model of sovereign illiquidity with three Nash 
equilibria facing creditors, it is quite likely that this incentive constraint rules out the 
no-crisis equilibrium, and either the mixed strategy equilibrium or the pure strategy 
where all creditors quit will be selected, depending on how severe the incentive 
problem is. In general, however, the termination probability is higher than necessary 
for incentive purposes, i.e. there are too many crises. This is the key result. 
 
Though, in general, interest rates are treated as given, we discuss briefly how they 
may be determined endogenously, depending on equilibrium selected. In particular, 
we indicate how the model might be calibrated to the data, with parameter chosen so 
as to generate sovereign spreads that vary over a range running from 300 to 7000 
basis points (see Table 5). The possible perverse effects of unregulated financial 
liberalisation are also discussed using this framework. 
 
Our analysis implies that bail-outs alone will not solve the underlying causes of a 
sovereign debt crises; and that the market equilibrium needed to provide the right 
incentives is excessively prone to financial crisis (i.e. to sudden stops in capital 
flows). So how can bond markets be made more efficient? We consider a bankruptcy 
procedure involving a temporary stay on creditor litigation and a discovery process 
for determining the underlying causes of default. A key element of the procedure is 
that when the sovereign debtor in default is found to have made little or no effort, its 
private payoffs will be reduced ex post. To provide the right incentives, it is crucial 
that the mechanism for doing this should have been agreed ex ante, as would be true if 
a ruled-governed public agency is involved. Moreover, we argue that privately issued 
bond contracts are unlikely to achieve the same result.  
 
The mechanism we describe incorporates features of the bankruptcy procedures 
advocated by the IMF (Krueger, 2002) -- though, unlike the IMF's proposal, it is not 
restricted to cases of ‘insolvency’. We conclude, therefore, that the institutional 
approach to sovereign debt restructuring proposed by the IMF is, in principle, capable 
of increasing bond market efficiency. What the rules should be -- and whether the 
IMF as currently constituted is the appropriate public agency to implement them -- are 
policy issues that remain to be discussed. 
  
In related work, Tirole (2002) has recently emphasised the ‘common agency 
problems’ affecting sovereign borrowing: the contracting externalities which may 
lead to over-borrowing and excessive short-term debt, and the collective action 
problems that prevent efficient roll-over and restructuring. Though our focus is 
somewhat different -- we take both the amount and maturity structure of sovereign 
debt as given -- the analytical approach we use has many features in common, 
including the assumption that there are debtor payoffs which cannot be secured by 
creditors (i.e. are not `contractible') and the links that are established between ex-post 
resolution procedures and ex-ante debtor incentives. Our institutional 
recommendation for increasing the contractibility of the debtor payoffs is not unlike 
Tirole's proposal to increase the ‘pledgable income’ of the sovereign debtor. 
  
For simplicity we have assumed that creditors all share the same information: but the 
information asymmetries stressed by Calvo would (as the Appendix suggests) greatly 
enrich the analysis. 
  
The framework developed here could be used to look at contagion in capital markets. 
Masson (1999, p. 267), for instance, argues that “pure contagion involves changes in 
expectations that is not related to country's macroeconomic fundamentals”. To include 
contagion on this definition, we need only relax the assumption that the market selects 
the most efficient incentive compatible equilibrium between creditors: a move from a 
mixed strategy equilibrium to the pure strategy of quitting unconnected with any 
change in fundamentals would count as contagion on Masson's definition (and, as 
Table 5 indicates, could double sovereign spreads). In future research, we intend to 
include the determination of sovereign spreads within the analysis; and to combine 
creditor heterogeneity and insolvency shocks with debtor moral hazard. Another 
useful extension would be to take account of the politics of decision-making within a 
debtor country and how it interacts with the debt crises. 
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Following Mexico’s moratorium on its external debt payments in 1982, virtually all vol-
untary lending to emerging markets by commercial banks ceased (Buchheit, 1999); and the
eighties came to be known as the ‘lost decade’ in Latin America. When lending to these
markets restarted in the 1990s as a result of the Brady Plan, lenders sought to avoid any
repeat of the write-downs imposed on commercial banks by swapping loans for sovereign
bonds. Unlike bank lending, however, Brady bonds issued under New York law cannot be
restructured without unanimous consent. While this may be a useful check on debtor’s ‘moral
hazard’, it means that emerging markets are exposed to financial crisis due to creditor panic
or extraneous shocks to their debt service capacity. Nevertheless, for some years, capital
kept flowing to emerging markets at modest rates of interest — underwritten in part by an
IMF policy of (ever increasing) bail-outs. Following Russia’s partial foreign debt repudiation
in August 1998, however, generous inflows to Latin America once again came to a stand-
still; and sovereign interest rate spreads rose to over 1600 basis points on the EMBI+ index,
remaining above 700 basis points for the next two years.
These developments — together with the collapsing currencies and soaring sovereign
spreads facing many Latin American countries in 2001/2 — have put in question traditional
explanations for financial crises, based on current account and fiscal deficits. They suggest
the need to focus on the intrinsic behaviour of capital markets (Calvo et al, 2002). Why do
sudden stops to the flows of finance occur? What are the economic consequences, and the
implications for institutional design?
In this paper, we focus on how problems of creditor co-ordination interact with debtor’s
incentives to generate excessive crises. In the literature, however, these issues are typi-
cally treated separately. In explaining bank runs, for example, Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
demonstrated the possibility of multiple equilibria in financial markets, taking as given the
structure of demand deposit contracts ( i.e. the right of depositors to withdraw on de-
mand) and the choice of investments by the bank. To help select the “good” equilibrium,
three institutional mechanisms were discussed — provision of liquidity, suspension of convert-
ibility and deposit insurance. Analogous co-ordination problems arise in connection with
emerging-market bonds1 and similar proposals have recently been made. Stanley Fischer
(1999), Radelet and Sachs (1998) and Truman (2001), for example, have emphasised oﬃcial
provision of liquidity; while Krugman (1998) called for capital outflow controls to protect
East Asian currencies (i.e. a suspension of convertibility). There has not been much talk
of explicit insurance, Soros (1998) and Jeanne (2001) being exceptions: but an additional
possibility has been widely discussed, that of revising the nature of sovereign debt contracts
themselves. Eichengreen and Portes (1995), Buchheit and Gulati (2000) and Taylor (2002)
have advocated the insertion of collective action clauses to assist creditor co-ordination.
Such proposals to solve creditor coordination problems have been criticised for failing to
take into account their eﬀect on sovereign debtors’ incentives. Barro (1998, p.18), for exam-
ple, suggested that bail-outs can increase the probability of sovereign default, stating that “
bailouts increase ‘moral hazard’ by rewarding and encouraging bad policies by governments
and excessive risk-taking by banks”. With reference to $42 billion package for Brazil in 1998,
for example, Barro asked: “How did the Brazilians qualify for this support? They did so
1Eaton (2002) uses a variant of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) in a sovereign debt context.
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mostly by not exercising sound fiscal policies. If their policies had been better, they would
not be in their current diﬃculties and would not qualify for IMF money”. After further
discussion of the bailouts for Mexico and Russia, he concluded “the IMF might consider
changing its name to the IMH— the Institute for Moral Hazard”.
Typically, however, debtor’s moral hazard has been considered in a separate strand of the
literature which focuses on the use of punishment strategies in models of repeated interaction.
In Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989a), for example, trade sanctions are the punishment mechanism to
prevent strategic default. But since their bargaining model assumes a single creditor lending
to a single debtor, creditor coordination problems are not discussed. Nor are they addressed
in Kletzer and Wright (2000), who use a repeated game model to study how restricting access
to capital markets can check moral hazard.2
A convincing treatment of sovereign debt crises and their resolution needs to combine
creditor co-ordination and debtor incentives in a consistent framework. In this paper, we
develop such a framework. It implies that bail-outs do not solve the underlying causes
of a sovereign debt crisis; and that the market equilibrium needed to provide the right
incentives is excessively prone to financial crisis (i.e. to sudden stops in capital flows).
To improve on the equilibrium market outcome, we analyse an international bankruptcy
procedure as ex-ante commitment device that involves (a) ensuring partial contractibility
of sovereign debtor’s payoﬀs, (b) temporary suspension of convertibility in a ‘discovery’
phase and (c) ex-post transfers. The mechanism we describe incorporates features of the
bankruptcy procedures advocated by the IMF (Krueger, 2002) — though, unlike the IMF’s
proposal, it is not restricted to cases of ‘insolvency’. On the other hand, it diﬀers sharply
from the ‘crisis insurance fund’3 recommended by Jeanne (2001) who assumes that solving
the creditor coordination problem has no impact on the debtor’s incentives.
In related work, Tirole (2002) has recently emphasised the ‘common agency problems’
aﬀecting sovereign borrowing: the contracting externalities which may lead to over-borrowing
and excessive short-term debt, and the collective action problems that prevent eﬃcient roll-
over and restructuring. Though our focus is somewhat diﬀerent — we take both the amount
and maturity structure of sovereign debt as given — the analytical approach we use has many
features in common, including the assumption that there are debtor payoﬀs which cannot be
secured by creditors (i.e. are not ‘contractible’) and the links that are established between ex-
post resolution procedures and ex-ante debtor incentives. Our institutional recommendation
for increasing the contractibility of the debtor payoﬀs is not unlike Tirole’s proposal to
increase the ‘pledgable income’ of the sovereign debtor.
The paper is structured as follows. To set the scene, we first describe the two principal
proposals for improving the international financial architecture currently under active con-
sideration, the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) advocated by the IMF
and the Collective Action Clauses recommended by the US Treasury. The analysis begins in
section 3 with a canonical two-player game of creditor coordination where neither creditor
2Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989b) point out that the threat of exclusion from capital markets may fail to satisfy
renegotiation proofness and may be of limited use in the case of a small open economy with access to insurance
markets.
3which bails out all governments facing a rollover crisis, conditional on fiscal adjustment.
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can make a credible commitment not to play a grab race, even when shocks are temporary.
To select between the multiple equilibria of the creditor game, we use debtor’s incentives —
rather than sunspots or risk dominance. To this end, we present a generic model of debtor
moral hazard, where the sovereign debtor cannot credibly (or verifiably) commit to putting in
eﬀort ex-ante, due to either sovereign immunity or non-contractibility of debtor payoﬀs; nor
can he commit to ex-post bargaining in the event of default. Then we examine how the equi-
librium selection in the creditor coordination problem interacts with the sovereign debtor’s
incentives and show that solving the sovereign debtor’s incentive problems requires excessive
‘project termination’ by creditors when sovereign default occurs. Though, in general, we
treat interest rates as given, we discuss briefly how they may be determined endogenously,
depending on equilibrium selected. Lastly, we consider potential improvements involving
either SDRM or changes to contracts.
While in the main body of the paper, we have, for simplicity, assumed that shocks are
temporary and creditors have symmetric (but incomplete) information about these shocks
and the actions chosen by the debtor, the appendix discusses the issues that arise when
creditors are unsure and disagree whether the shock is temporary or permanent 4. The model
and results in the Appendix share with Calvo (1999) the focus on asymmetric information
and heterogenous creditors as causes of excessive crises.
1 Sovereign debt restructuring: Two mechanisms
1.1 Collective action clauses in bond contracts
After the Mexican crisis of 1994/5, the Deputies of the G-10 made a number of recommen-
dations to facilitate crisis management (Group of Ten Report, 1996). As regards liquidity
provision, for example, they suggested that the IMF should ‘lend into arrears’ for countries
whose domestic policies were deemed acceptable. For the private sector, they commended
changes to contractual provisions covering sovereign debt (so as to allow for the col-
lective representation of bondholders; for supermajority voting on changing the terms and
conditions of the debt contract; and for sharing of proceeds among creditors). Such ideas
had found academic support in the work of Eichengreen and Portes (1995) who also recom-
mended the creation of a Bondholders Council to help negotiate debt reconstruction. But
markets have proved very slow to respond, possibly because of adverse signalling reasons
(Eichengreen, 1999). However in Febraury 2003 Mexico took the initiative by selling $1
billion dollar in 12-year global notes including collective action clauses, at spread of only
3.125% over comparable US Treasuries .
The desperate case of Argentina has re-opened the debate on sovereign debt restructur-
ing.5 Thus in April 2002, John Taylor (2002), on behalf of the US Treasury, argued forcefully
for the inclusion of collective action clauses in the emerging market debt. To help overcome
4Although the link between asymmetric information (among creditors) and ex-ante debtor’s incentives is
ignored in the Appendix, we plan to analyse in future work.
5The sovereigns involved in the 1997/8 financial crisis in East Asia were not substantial debtors (at least
ex ante): the debt was largely private and so in principle involved issues of corporate debt restructuring.
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the problem of transition, the US Treasury proposed adding substantial “carrots and sticks”
as incentives to change. (Positive incentives could include lower interest rate charges when
borrowing from the IMF; and further financial inducements to carry out bond swaps on the
existing stock: additionally, the insertion of such clauses could be made a precondition of
seeking an IMF programme.) To tackle problems of asset diversity, it was proposed that such
clauses could be included in bank debt as well. For problems of aggregation across creditor
classes, it was proposed that disputes between creditors could be handled in an arbitration
process provided for in the contracts themselves. An alternative suggestion from Morgan
Chase and Co. is that of a two-step bond swap where the first step is designed to achieve
uniformity of claim, and the second step is the actual restructuring, Bartholomew, Stern,
and Liuzzi (2002).
1.2 A sovereign debt restructuring mechanism
In response to the Mexican crisis of 1994/5, Jeﬀrey Sachs (1995) argued that sovereigns
needed the basic protections available to corporate borrowers; and he proposed an interna-
tional bankruptcy court to oversee sovereign debt restructuring. Rogoﬀ and Zettelmeyer
(2002) provide an account of this and other proposals for revising an international financial
architecture to incorporate bankruptcy-style procedures.
The new Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism first outlined by Krueger (2001) was
clearly inspired by the analogy of the US corporate bankruptcy procedures, Chapter 11 in
particular. While collective action clauses also embody similar provisions for supermajority
voting, the IMF claims that SDRM is necessary to solve the problems of aggregation and of
transition discussed above (Anne Krueger, 2002, p.14).
1.3 The evolution of corporate debt restructuring and its implications
As a matter of history, Buchheit and Gulati (2002) contrast the diﬀerent paths taken by
Britain and United States in respect of corporate debt restructuring. As indicated in Column
1 of the table below, UK creditors inserted collective action clauses into their bonds in the
nineteenth century; but — because these clauses were not acceptable under New York law —
the US adopted court-ordered bankruptcy proceedings under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code. Buchheit and Gulati argue that the global economy should now follow the lead of
the London bond market by adopting collective action clauses, implemented if neccessary by
‘exit consent swaps’, i.e. bond exchanges where creditors accepting the new contract agree
to changes which render the old contracts less attractive. These links between corporate
history and the current debate on sovereign debt are summarised in Table 1.
This historical precedent may suggest that collective action clauses and court-ordered
procedures are substitutes. But the London capital market has subsequently gone on to
develop court-ordered bankruptcy procedures analogous to those in the US, so they may
well be complementary (Miller, 2002). While it may be easier in the short run to solve
the transition problem of modifying bond contracts than it is to revise the IMF Articles
of Agreement; there may nevertheless be advantages in having an explicit sovereign debt
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Table 1: Debt restructuring: Two approaches
Corporations Sovereign states
Self-organizing
creditors
19th century Britain:
Majority Action Clauses
London debt: Collective
Action Clauses plus
Exit Consent/ Swaps
Court-ordered
restructuring
20th century USA:
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism (SDRM)
restructuring mechanism.The simple model of sovereign debt that follows abstracts from
the aggregation and transition problems which play such an important role in the current
debate: it does suggest, however, that sovereign bankruptcy procedures combined with IMF-
style conditionality can better achieve the commitment needed than would collective action
clauses inserted into bond contracts.
2 Creditor co-ordination without moral hazard
Take the case of a sovereign embarking on a bond-financed investment project, costing K,
which lasts only two periods. All the finance is supplied by two investors, investing b each,
who are promised returns of r in the first period and (1 + r) in the second period. So long
as resources available cover these payments (i.e. cash flow in period 1 is greater than 2rb
and cash flow in period 2 is greater than (1 + r)2b), all is well and the project will run to
completion.
Consider what happens if an unanticipated, exogenous shock (‘bad luck’) lowers the
capacity to pay in period one below the amount that is due to bond holders under their
contract. If it is strictly a shock to liquidity, which is what we assume here, then project
net worth will be unchanged. One example might be a country hit by contagion where the
funds earmarked for debt service are suddenly withdrawn (as for Korea in 1998); another
would be a sovereign debtor in a ‘credit chain’ forced into default by delays in payment by its
creditors. Since failure to comply with the terms of the debt contract constitutes technical
default, each creditor is entitled to accelerate its claim, demanding the capital sum as well
as the current coupon owed in period 1, i.e. technical default makes the debt ‘callable’ in
period 1 and exposes the sovereign to the risk of a liquidity crisis. (Acceleration of the claim
in this way normally requires a minimum percentage of creditors to act, usually 25%: but in
our two-creditor model, one is enough.) See Figure 1.
The co-ordination game facing the two creditors is shown in Table 2 below where the
actions of Creditor 1 (Quit, Stay) are indicated by rows 1 and 2 respectively; likewise for
Creditor 2 by the columns. In the cells showing the resulting payoﬀs, those for Creditor 1
are given first.
Symbols used and key assumptions made in determining the payoﬀs are as follows. First,
if either creditor accelerates its claim, the project will end (i.e. there is a minimum level
of resources K1 < K required for continuation, and (1 + r)b > K − K1) where Q < K
is the recovery amount if the project is terminated in period 1. Second, the creditor who
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Figure 1: Timeline of events: Liquidity shocks
t = 0
Creditors lend
Nature 
chooses 
shock
Default or 
no default
Creditors 
decide to 
stay or withdraw
t = 1 t = 2
Final payment
 to creditors
Table 2: How Payoﬀs depend on Creditor Co-ordination
Actions 2 QUITS 2 STAYS
1 QUITS Q/2− L Q/2− L min{(1 + r)b,Q}− L max{Q− (1 + r)b, 0}
1 STAYS max{Q− (1 + r)b, 0} min{(1 + r)b,Q}− L (1 + r)b (1 + r)b
accelerates when the other does not, reckons to recover either his initial investment b plus
interest rb or the full quit value minus the privately borne legal costs of quitting L — leaving
the other creditor with the residual, if any, as in a grab race for a firm’s assets where
liquidation allows the first mover to exit without much loss of value but liquidation is costly
for other creditors. Third, if both quit, they each pay legal fees, L, and split the expected
recovery amount equally between themselves. (Most bargaining solutions support the latter
assumption, including those of Nash and Kalai - Smorodinsky.) Last of all, we assume that
unpaid interest is rolled-up and added to the coupon in period 2, so there is no loss of value
to the bondholders if the project continues. Thus, if both creditors decide to stay, the payoﬀs
are as shown in the bottom right cell.
Table 3: Normalised expected, discounted payoﬀs for the co-ordination game
Actions 2 QUITS 2 STAYS
1 QUITS 0 0 ε δ(< 0)
1 STAYS δ(< 0) ε 1 1
As is evident after normalising the payoﬀs6 (see table 3, where 1 > ε > 0 > δ ), this
coordination game has three Nash equilibria, two in pure strategies - (Stay, Stay) with unit
payoﬀs and (Quit, Quit) with zero payoﬀ — and a third in mixed strategies where each
6By subtracting payoﬀs in the top left cell and scaling by payoﬀs in the bottom right cell.
7
creditor quits with probability q = 1−ε1−ε−δ . The payoﬀs of the normalised game are shown in
Fig. 2 together with three equilibria indicated at A, B and C. Pure strategy equilibrium A
represents a total coordination failure among creditors; and the mixed strategy equilibrium
B represents a partial coordination failure.
What quit rates might one expect in the mixed strategy equilibrium? In their discussion
of sovereign spreads, Cline and Barnes (1997) use a recovery rate of 0.5. If, correspondingly,
one was to assume that the recovery value if the project is liquidated in the first period is
suﬃcient to repay only one of the two creditors i.e. Q = (1 + r)b, and that the legal fee
faced by any creditor accelerating his claim is equal to 10 % i.e. L = 0.1(1 + r)b, we find
that, in the mixed strategy equilibrium, the individual quit rate is 0.2 and the continuation
probability is 0.64. In this case, the pay-oﬀs and equilibria will appear as illustrated in Fig.
2.
Figure 2: Discounted expected payoﬀ in period 1: The creditor co-ordination game (with
normalised payoﬀs)
Payoff to 
Creditor 2
Payoff to Creditor 1
(Stay, Stay)
(Quit, Stay)
(Stay, Quit)
(Quit, Quit)
1
1
A
B
C
ε
δ
How is one to select between these equilibria? One possible answer is that the equilibrium
is selected by sunspots. Sunspots are random, payoﬀ-irrelevant states of nature which are
publicly observed and are used by creditors to coordinate their expectations and actions
(see, for instance, Jeanne, 2001, Peck and Shell, 2003). This approach implies that sovereign
debt crisis occur with positive probability: but the probability is entirely independent of the
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underlying economic fundamentals — an aspect which Morris and Shin (1998) criticise.
A second approach might be to focus on equilibria in pure strategies and use risk domi-
nance as the selection criterion used by creditors. Note that, in this context, quitting is risk
dominant when the gain to being the first mover in the creditor grab race is relatively large.7
(Let α and 1−α be the probabilities that player 1 attaches to the other player quitting and
staying, respectively. Then expected payoﬀs to quitting and staying for player 1 are ε(1−α)
and 1 − (1 − δ)α. The condition for quitting to be strictly risk dominant (i.e. ε(1 − α)
> 1− (1− δ)α) is that |δ| > 1− ε.)
A more satisfactory theory of which equilibrium will be chosen lies, we believe, in the
need to provide appropriate incentives for the debtor, which is what we examine in the next
section. While the main body of the paper deals only with the case of two creditors, the
Appendix examines the general case and shows that the key features — the existence of
two pure strategy Nash equilibria and an other mixed strategy equilibrium— continue to hold
with n identical creditors. The second issue discussed in the Appendix is the extension of the
creditor coordination game to the case where the shock on the country’s fundamentals is not
temporary. Where, conditional on default, there is incomplete information and disagreement
within creditors about whether the shock is temporary or permanent, it is possible to show
that, at equilibrium, there is ineﬃcient termination of the project as well.8
3 Sovereign borrowing with moral hazard
Selecting equilibrium without taking account of debtor’s behaviour is inappropriate if diﬀer-
ent solutions to the creditor coordination problem alter incentives of the sovereign debtor.
If the probability of project termination were reduce to zero, for instance, this could have
the perverse consequence of actually increasing the possibility of sovereign debt crises, as
the sovereign debtor uses the money borrowed from creditors unwisely, Barro (1998). It is
possible, therefore, that a positive probability of termination may be needed to solve the
moral hazard problem.
The model of debtors moral hazard developed here is of a small open economy where,
as in Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989b), the interest rate at which the sovereign can borrow in
world markets is fixed. (For simplicity, dynamic interactions between creditors and sovereign
debtors such as those involved in models of reputation are ignored9.) Assume as before that
7With fixed legal fees and no sharing clauses, the strategy of quitting is risk dominant if recovery rates are
higher than 20 percent of the total amount borrowed, i.e. Q > 0.4(1 + r)b. When Q = 0.4(1 + r)b, however,
the two pure strategies have the same expected pay-oﬀs, so the Harsanyi and Selten’s criterion (1984) coincide
with the mixed strategy equilibrium.
8Some commentators, Stiglitz (2002a) and Calvo et al (2002) for example, believe that asymmetric in-
formation between creditors is main reason for excessive default, rather than the problem of debtor’s moral
hazard. In a complete analysis, it should be possible to combine asymmetric information problems with those
of debtors moral hazard.
9There is no loss of generality in doing so as Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1990) have shown that reputation may
not be renegotiation proof in models of sovereign debt in small open economies.
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the sovereign issues debt in period 0 which promises an interest coupon in period 1 and
repayment the capital sum together with a second interest coupon in period 2. But before
the first coupon becomes due, there are two events that may lead to default. First the debtor
has to choose a level of eﬀort, either good and bad; and second an independently-determined
negative shock arrives with probability p. Since we are still looking at liquidity crises, bad
eﬀort in this context involves condoning (or causing) cash flows to be temporarily reduced
so that debt interest due cannot be paid on time. (It might involve those in power shipping
cash overseas in a flight of capital which leads to default, for example.) We assume that
either bad eﬀort or a negative exogenous shock is suﬃcient to cause default — but which of
these is not immediately evident. If the cause of the technical default is revealed fairly soon
(‘early’) i.e. before creditors decide to stay or withdraw, the delay is not significant. But
the problem of debtor’s moral hazard arises when creditors have to decide whether to stay
or withdraw before revelation takes place, see Fig. 3.
Figure 3: Timeline of events
t = 0
Creditors lend
Nature 
chooses 
shock
Default or 
no default
Creditors 
decide to 
stay or withdraw
t = 1
t = 2
Early Later Never
When choice of effort is revealedDebtors choose 
non-contractible 
effort
There are four possible out-turns in period 1, as shown in Fig. 4 below, where it is
assumed that with good eﬀort plus good luck the coupon can be paid, but not otherwise. If
coupon is paid on time, of course, creditors have no option to terminate the loan, and the
project continues to completion. But when the coupon is not paid, creditors can accelerate.
It is assumed that creditors are able to distinguish between a default caused by bad
luck plus bad eﬀort and defaults due to only one of these factors; but that they are unable
to distinguish between cases of the latter. So, as the circle in Figure 4 indicates, they are
unable to distinguish between default due to a bad shock (for example, a delay in receipt of
payments due to the sovereign in period 1) combined with good eﬀort, and one due to just
bad eﬀort - with no shock (capital flight , for example).
In the subgame following default, the co-ordination game facing the two creditors is
shown in Table 4 below.
The only new elements are the continuation values if both creditors choose to stay. As
before, we assume that unpaid interest is rolled-up and added to the coupon in period 2, so
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Figure 4: Events prior to default or no default in period 1
Debtor
Nature Nature
Good effort Bad effort
No shock
(1-p )
Bad shock
(p )
No shock
(1-p )
Bad shock
(p )
No default Default Default Default
Table 4: How Payoﬀs depend on Creditor Co-ordination
Actions 2 QUITS 2 STAYS
1 QUITS Q/2− L Q/2− L min{(1 + r)b,Q}− L max{Q− (1 + r)b, 0}
1 STAYS max{Q− (1 + r)b, 0} min{(1 + r)b,Q}− L (1 + r)b− (1− p)h (1 + r)b− (1− p)h
there is no loss of value to the bondholders from a temporary exogenous shock if the project
continues. But creditors will not be paid in full if the sovereign does not put in good eﬀort.
Let p be the probability of a exogenous shock drawn by nature and h denote the ”hair-cut”
taken by creditors (due to bad eﬀort by the debtor)10. With probability p, each debtor
obtains (1 + r)b at t = 2 while with probability 1− p, each creditor suﬀers a hair cut, h, at
t = 2; therefore, conditional on the default at t = 1, the expected payoﬀ to each creditor at
t = 2 is (1 + r)bp+ [(1 + r)b− h](1− p) = (1 + r)b− h(1− p)).
After normalisation, the payoﬀ matrix will have the same structure as before; and there-
fore the set of equilibria remains unchanged. In this section, we will focus on the mixed
strategy equilibrium where either creditor quits with probability q. Since either one leaving
triggers disorderly default, the continuation probability is 1− πc = (1− q)2 where πc is the
probability of disorderly default.
What if the need to provide incentives for the debtor to put in good eﬀort is used as a
10While we refer to good and bad eﬀort, the model may be interpreted such that the debtor chooses low
and high risk growth strategies, for example where the latter poses the risk of a positive hair cut in period 2.
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principle for selecting equilibrium? Assume that the continuation outcome, where neither
quits, cannot be the part of a sub-game perfect equilibrium where the debtor chooses to put
in eﬀort (i.e. assume that a debtor, whose funding is guaranteed, will inevitably be tempted
to put in bad eﬀort). By contrast, the outcome where creditors quit for sure will certainly give
debtor an incentive to put in eﬀort: but it is socially ineﬃcient as any temporary exogenous
shock will trigger a liquidity crisis. The mixed strategy equilibrium should provide some
incentives for the debtor, but will this be socially eﬃcient?
3.1 Debtor moral hazard and incentive compatible randomisation
The source of moral hazard in our model is that the sovereign debtor has incentives that are
not aligned with those of the creditors. Funded by resources borrowed in the international
bond markets, we assume that the sovereign debtor receives ‘private payoﬀs’ when the project
terminates at t = 1 or at t = 2. To begin with, we assume that these payoﬀs are essentially
‘non-contractible’, i.e. cannot be attached by the creditors in settlement of their claims -
nor can the sovereign debtor make a credible commitment to transfer these payoﬀs to the
creditors. If funds are used to subsidise a public corporation, for example, the assets of the
corporation are not attachable even though the sovereign has waived immunity: so these
assets would count as private payoﬀs. Funds transferred to private citizens fall in the same
category: the added popularity of the government is not something that creditors can attach
either.
We further assume that the value of these debtor payoﬀs depends on whether ‘eﬀort’
is good or bad, where good eﬀort implies that default only occurs with the bad exogenous
shock but bad eﬀort implies that default is inevitable. Good eﬀort could correspond to a
situation where, for instance, money is borrowed and used to promote R&D in the export
sector to help the country remain internationally competitive. Bad eﬀort might correspond
to transferring borrowed money to rich people who are free to put it in tax havens overseas,
exposing the country to currency risk and the budget to a loss of tax revenue. (An alter-
native interpretation, suggested by James Tobin, would be that good eﬀort corresponds to
properly regulated liberalisation of domestic financial markets and bad eﬀort corresponds to
un-regulated financial liberalisation.11)
Let uGt and u
B
t denote the expected, discounted payoﬀs (measured at t = 1) for the
sovereign debtor when the project is terminated at period t, t = 1, 2. We assume, for
simplicity, that there is no residual value of the project after paying for debt service and
repayment, so uGt and u
B
t consist of the non-contractible benefits to the sovereign. Suppose
uGt < u
B
t for all t. In that event, there is no solution to the debtor moral hazard problem
without a bankruptcy procedure because, ex ante, the sovereign debtor will always choose
the bad eﬀort even if the project is terminated in period 1. The intermediary case, which
we study below, is when uG1 > u
B
1 but u
G
2 < u
B
2 . This is shown in Fig. 5 where BB, the
11“The central bank, committed to honor the peg and to maintain the country’s terms of trade, has to
protect its reserves. It cannot be indiﬀerent to the claims on those reserves negotiated by private parties,
domestic and foreign, who ignore the social risks. An obvious precaution is to limit even to zero the net
indebtedness (particularly the short-term debt) in hard currency permitted any private bank.” Tobin (1999,
p.73)
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schedule showing expected payoﬀ to bad eﬀort, is steeper than GG which gives the expected
payoﬀ to good eﬀort. If the probability of continuation 1− π, was equal to 0, second-period
payoﬀ would of course be irrelevant. As 1 − π increases to one, however, the prospect of
continuation with high private benefits makes bad eﬀort (‘shirking’) more attractive.
Figure 5: Debtor moral hazard: The no-shirking constraint
Payoff to debtor
uB1
uG1
uG2
uB2
1−π1−πm
B
B
G
G
To ensure that the sovereign chooses good eﬀort, the probability of continuation must
not exceed 1−πm where the two schedules intersect in Fig. 5. It follows that the equilibrium
selected in the creditor coordination game must satisfy a ‘no shirking’ constraint associated
with debtor’s moral hazard. Conditional on default, if creditors always choose to stay,
the debtor’s ex-ante incentives to choose good eﬀort will never be satisfied. The other
extreme situation is when creditors always quit after default. This will solve the debtors
incentive problem but is obviously socially ineﬃcient as a debtor applying his best eﬀorts
would nevertheless face certain default in the presence of a unfavourable temporary shock. An
intermediate solution is that creditors coordinate on the mixed strategy equilibrium. As the
continuation probability at the mixed strategy equilibrium, 1−πc, is derived independently of
debtor incentives, there is no reason why it should coincide with the continuation probability
1−πm associated with the no-shirking constraint. (Of course, the creditors could panic and
choose the pure strategy of quitting: by assuming that, where it is incentive compatible,
creditors coordinate on the mixed strategy equilibrium in the event of default biases, our
analysis is biased in favour of the market solution.)
These results are summarised in Fig. 6. On the vertical axis is plotted 1 − πc, the
probability of continuation given the mixed strategy equilibrium of the creditor co-ordination
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game, while on the horizontal is plotted 1 − πm, the continuation probability required for
time-consistency or ‘subgame perfection’ on the part of the debtor. The shaded part of the
figure shows the excess default probabilities relative to second best.12
Figure 6: Excessive probability of disorderly default
1−πc
1−πm 1
E
1
SGP default probability
Mixed strategy equilibrium 
of co-ordination game
Pure strategy of default
Let NEC denote the Nash equilibrium continuation probability, where NEC ≡ 1 − πc
= (1− q)2 when (1− q)2 < 1−πm and NEC = 0 otherwise; and let ICC denote the incentive
compatibility continuation probability, 1 − πm. How providing the right incentives for the
debtor almost always leads to excessive crises is shown graphically in Fig. 7. Creditor
payoﬀs and the three Nash equilibria of the co-ordination game are shown in top left panel.
The non-contractible payoﬀs to the debtor are shown in the top right panel and ICC, the
maximum probability of continuation compatible with good eﬀort, is shown as 1 − πm on
the horizontal axis (below the intersection of GG and BB at I). How does this incentive
compatibility constraint aﬀect the selection of equilibrium for creditors? Clearly it rules out
equilibrium at C (Stay, Stay). It is, however, consistent with the mixed strategy equilibrium
at B. This can be seen (in the bottom right panel) by comparing the incentive compatibility
constraint, 1 − πm, with the continuation probability associated with the mixed strategy
equilibrium, 1− πc. The latter is the square of the individual continuation probability 1− q
12The second best outcome, in this context, corresponds to the case where an international lender of last
resort bails out both creditors for sure but only rescues the debtor with probability 1− πm, i.e. it practices
a policy of ‘constructive ambiguity’ where the probabilities are defined by the need to solve the incentive
problem.
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Figure 7: Creditor Coordination and Debtor Moral Hazard
(see lower left panel) where this, in turn, is derived13 from the mixed strategy equilibrium B
(as shown in the top right panel).
Although the level of randomisation in the mixed strategy equilibrium is consistent with
the debtor putting in eﬀort (as 1−πm ≥ 1−πc), there is ‘too much’ randomisation (measured
by distance xx’ in the figure) as a higher continuation probability among creditors would also
be incentive compatible. It is in this sense that the mixed strategy equilibrium is ineﬃcient
and the excess randomisation is indicated by the shaded triangle in the diagram.
This ineﬃciency would greatly increase, however, if the continuation probability from the
co-ordination game were to rise above 1− πm (i.e. if point B were to approach suﬃciently
close to C). In that case, the only credible equilibrium consistent with debtor incentive is
where both creditor quit as soon as default occurs. The excess randomisation in this case,
1−πm, is shown by the shaded box in the lower right panel. Only at the point E is the Nash
Equilibrium randomisation equal to the incentive compatible randomisation. This is what
13The expected pay-oﬀ for Creditor 1 playing a pure strategy of quitting is shown by horizontal co-ordinate
of B; so the ratio Ab to AD indicates the continuation probability of Creditor 2. By symmetry, this is also
characteristic of Creditor 1; and so, by construction, Ab gives the numerical value of the common continuation
probability.
15
leads to the conclusion that, in the absence of bankruptcy style procedures, there will almost
always be excessive disorderly default in sovereign bond markets.
The above discussion can be summarised as:
Proposition 1 Almost always, NEC > ICC.
3.2 Implications for sovereign spreads
To simplify the analysis, we have treated the interest rate as predetermined. In reality,
however, sovereign spreads would be endogenous, varying with the equilibrium selected.
Ideally14, we would extend the theory to explain how interest rates are determined and
test the predictions of the extended model on relevant data. For present purposes, we
restrict ourselves to indicating briefly how our model might be calibrated to fit recent data.
As discussed in the introduction, emerging market sovereign spreads over US Treasuries
responded sharply to the Russian default. From a level of between 400 and 500 basis points
earlier in 1998, they peaked at over 1600 after the Russian default in August and then fell
to somewhere between 700 and 800 in 2000. In 2001, Argentine debt suﬀered spreads of
2000 basis points and above, as did Brazilian debt in the summer of 2002. (After leaving
the currency peg, Argentina has recorded even higher spreads of around 7000 basis points.)
In Table 5, illustrative parameters are chosen so as to generate sovereign spreads that vary
over a range running from 300 to 7000 bps. Case 1 with low quit probability and high risk of
bad shock, quitting is risk dominant and the mixed strategy is consistent with spread of 800
basis points. In case 2 with high quit probability and low risk of bad shock, neither quitting
nor staying are risk dominant (see discussion in Section 3 above) and sovereign spreads can
rise to 7000 basis points.
The sovereign spread, S, is calculated using the formula:
S = πp(1−R) and 1− π = (1− q)2, so S = [1− (1− q)2]p(1−R)
where p is a probability of a bad shock, π is a conditional probability of termination given
default, q is the individual quit probability in the mixed strategy equilibrium and R is the
recovery rate on debt. In Eichengreen and Bordo (2001), it is reported that, from 1973-97, a
randomly-selected country (from a sample of 56 countries including OECD numbers) had a
probability of experiencing crisis of 12 % per annum. Given the higher incidence of crises in
emerging market countries, we choose a figure of 0.16 to characterise the probability of crisis
in the mixed strategy equilibrium for emerging markets. Setting πp at 0.16 and combining
this with a value of 0.5 for (1−R), Cline and Barnes (1997), this implies a sovereign spread
of 800 basis points, or 8 percentage points at the mixed strategy equilibrium, see line 2 of
Table 5, Case 1. Note that, in this case, the continuation probability conditional on default
is set at 0.6 (in line with the earlier discussion in Section 3 above): this implies a value of
0.4 for π and a quit probability, q, of 0.23 as shown in bold in line 2. In Case 2, where the
14as suggested by Renato Flores and Federico Sturzenegger.
16
recovery rate is cut to 30 %, and q is set at 0.5, the continuation probability falls by more
than half to 0.25, as shown in bold in the lower half of the table.
The sovereign spreads associated with the mixed strategy equilibrium will fall on the
application of a ‘second-best’ strategy of Constructive Ambiguity ( labelled CA in the table).
Assume, for example, that the lowest rate of termination consistent with good eﬀort is πm =
0.2. This policy would reduce sovereign spreads to 400 bps or about 300 bps, depending on
the value of p, see the first row of each case. If, on the other hand, moral hazard problems
were suﬃciently severe as to shift the market equilibrium to the pure strategy of quitting
whenever technical default occurred, sovereign spreads could rise sharply. In Case 1 where
the increase in termination probability more than doubles, spreads widen to 2000 basis points:
in Case 2 where termination is quite likely in any case, sovereign spreads rise to around 1500
basis points.
Given the moral hazard constraint, selecting the pure equilibrium of stay/stay would
remove the incentive to put in eﬀort and increase the probability of a haircut to 1 uncondi-
tionally. In this event, assuming for simplicity that h =1-R, sovereign spreads rise to 5000
or 7000 as shown in the bottom line of each case.
Table 5: Sovereign Risk: Illustrative examples
q 1− q 1− π π p 1−R Spread
in bps
Spread
in %
Case 1: Low quit probability/high risk of bad shock
’Second Best’ CA na na 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.5 400 4
Mixed strategy 0.23 0.77 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.5 800 8
Quit/Quit 1 0 0 1 0.4 0.5 2000 20
Stay/Stay 0 1 1 0 na 0.5 5000 50
Case 2: High quit probability/low risk of bad shock
’Second Best’ CA na na 0.8 0.2 0.213 0.7 298 3
Mixed strategy 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.75 0.213 0.7 1280 13
Quit/Quit 1 0 0 1 0.213 0.7 1491 15
Stay/Stay 0 1 1 0 na 0.7 7000 70
The framework developed here could be used to look at contagion in capital markets.15
Masson (1999, p. 267), for instance, argues that “pure contagion involves changes in expec-
tations that is not related to country’s macroeconomic fundamentals” and suggests that “by
analogy to the literature on bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), attacks on countries
which involve a simultaneous move from a non-run to a run equilibrium seem to be relevant
for recent experience in emerging market countries”. To include contagion on this definition,
we need only relax the assumption that the market selects the most eﬃcient incentive com-
patible equilibrium between creditors: a move from a mixed strategy equilibrium to the pure
15There are those who argue that the doubling of sovereign spreads seen in Brazil in 2002 is largely due to
contagion from the Argentine crisis.
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strategy of quitting unconnected with any change in fundamentals would count as contagion
on Masson’s definition; and, as Table 5 indicates, could double sovereign spreads.
Note that changes in interest rates as between the mixed strategy and the pure strategy
of quitting are, in fact, likely to change the default probability. Taking into account of this
could lead to models of self-fulfilling crises such as those of Aghion et al. (2000) and Sachs
et al. (1996).
3.3 Possible perverse eﬀects of un-regulated financial liberalisation
Financial liberalisation in the absence of appropriate regulation can increase the risk of
financial crisis (Goldstein, 1997; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). In the framework developed
here, this can come about through a fall in 1−πm, together with an increase in 1−πc. The
former, the tightening of the ‘no-shirking constraint’, could occur if liberalisation makes it
more attractive to pursue the bad eﬀort strategy — if it makes it easier to ship money out
of the country to evade taxes, for example16. This increases the pay-oﬀs to low eﬀort and,
as shown by the upward shift from BB to B’B’ in Fig. 8, shifts the intersection with GG
to the left, which reduces the incentive compatible continuation probability (to 1− πm). If
the mixed strategy equilibrium of the co-ordination game remains at 1−πc, however, it may
still satisfy the incentive compatibility condition and there will be no eﬀect on equilibrium,
see figure. But what if liberalisation also cuts the cost of exit in the co-ordination game?
(A fall in legal costs makes quitting more attractive: so, in the mixed strategy equilibrium,
the probability of staying must be increased to balance the expected pay-oﬀs of quitting
and staying — and this increases the continuation probability of the game.) The new mixed
strategy equilibrium could then fall afoul of the no-shirking constraint, as shown by 1−πc in
the figure: hence, in the face of default for any reason, only the threat of certain withdrawal
will be suﬃcient to check debtor’s moral hazard. The results could be dramatic: as shown
in Lines 2 and 3 of the table above, a shift from the mixed strategy equilibrium to the pure
strategy equilibrium could raise the sovereign spread from 800 to 2000 bps.
Is this more than a theoretical curiosum? As Tobin (1999, p.73) notes: “In the ‘bailout’
packages for East Asian economies, further cross-border financial liberalization was one of
the conditions imposed by the IMF and the U.S. Treasury for oﬃcial loans. This was a
surprising requirement, given the evident facts that excessive private external short-term
debt was, if not a cause of the crisis, a serious aggravation of it, and that banking and
financial institutions seemed to need more regulations in several respects as well as fewer in
other respects.” Pressure to increase competition in financial markets may also be counter-
productive in the absence of appropriate financial regulation (Hellman et al., 2000).
16“The very large measurement error in world current-account positions (a deficit larger than $100 billion
for 1996), with recorded payments of capital income being much greater than recorded receipts, gives credence
to the suggestion that a substantial portion of international capital movements is tax-avoiding in motive.”
(Cooper, 1998, p.14).
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Figure 8: Possible eﬀects of badly-designed liberalisation
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4 Sovereign bankruptcy procedures as a commitment device
We have seen that, in the absence of institutional innovation, there will be excessive disorderly
default in equilibrium. Could this be reduced by institutional change?
Where creditors can, in event of default, exercise some legal claim over the assets of
the sovereign state or its citizens, there is a good case for a bankruptcy procedure. This
might involve the following elements. Ex ante, the sovereign agrees to bargaining in good
faith after default, and to this end establishes some ‘contractibility’ on assets in favour
of the creditors. This might involve waiving sovereign immunity and agreeing that some
foreign interest payments and loans17 could be diverted in favour of creditors as part of the
bargaining process. Note that this enhanced ‘contractibility’ must also have the eﬀect of
reducing private payoﬀs to the sovereign; otherwise it will not have the desired incentive
eﬀects.
When a default occurs, however, the sovereign debtor is aﬀorded protection by a temporary
stay on creditor litigation. This legitimises the suspension of payments and also prevents
litigation (by ‘vultures’) from inhibiting negotiations, Miller and Zhang (2000). Furthermore,
17Eaton (2002, p. 13) discusses the idea that “a portion of any loan be held in escrow at the time that
it is extended. The escrow account would be turned over to the sovereign as it repaid its loan according to
schedule. Upon declaration of a standstill, however, funds would be paid instead to creditors.”
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it provides a breathing space for a ‘discovery’ process where eﬀorts are made to establish the
underlying causes of default (and to determine whether it was due to a bad shock or poor
eﬀort). If this reveals the debtor to have made appropriate eﬀort and to be suﬀering from
an exogenous shock, bargaining would involve debt restructuring — the lengthening of debt
maturities for temporary shock, and some write-down for a permanent shock known to be
outside the control of the debtor. But if the debtor is revealed to have made little or no
eﬀort to arrange its financial and fiscal aﬀairs, then it will be penalised with payoﬀs changed
ex post in ways that have been agreed ex ante. (It is to make this possible that the debtor
must have agreed to make some private payoﬀs contractible.)
Along similar lines, Eaton (2002, p.5) observes: “One role that an international bankruptcy
court could play is in clarifying the extent of the sovereign’s malfeasance in a default, and
applying penalties appropriately.” He goes on to note that: “Tougher sanctions in response
to malfeasance that leads to default is ultimately in the interest of sovereign countries, as it
enhances their access to credit”. This can be shown in Fig. 9 where an ex ante agreement
to transfer funds to the creditors in period 2, in event that default is discovered to be at-
tributable to low eﬀort reduces the private benefits, swivels the BB schedule clockwise and
so increases the maximum continuation probability. If ex ante contracting ensures that uB2 is
less than or equal to uG2 , as shown by the lower dotted line in the figure, then the maximum
incentive-compatible continuation probability shifts to one and the creditors can safely roll
over their lending without fear of moral hazard. Even if the moral hazard constraint does
not rise to one, but only to 1−πm as shown in the figure, bankruptcy procedures can reduce
the termination probability without completely eliminating them.
Figure 9: Shifting the no-shirking constraint by an ex ante contract
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Before turning to the institutional implications, consider two special cases. First is where
the reasons for default are known as soon as it occurs, i.e without a discovery phase. Here,
there is no need for an extended bankruptcy procedure. If the default is due to an exogenous
shock, liquidity can be provided right away. If the default is due to lack of eﬀort, then
the debtor’s payoﬀs are changed ex post in ways that have been agreed ex ante. This is
perspective taken by Olivier Jeanne (2001) who argues that “the institution that brings the
economy the closest to the first-best is a ‘crisis insurance fund’ that bails out all governments
with a rollover crisis conditional on the fiscal adjustment”, (p.19, italics in the original).
Under his proposed scheme, moral hazard is neutralized by denying bailouts to countries
that have not implemented the fiscal adjustment. Jeanne notes, however, the crisis fund
would probably have to be a rule-based public agency, first because of ‘time to verify’18 and
second because private insurance contract for sovereigns cannot be made contingent on fiscal
eﬀort which is under their control.
At the other end of the spectrum is the special case where the discovery phase is com-
pletely unrevealing, so the indeterminacy as to the causes of default can never be resolved. In
these circumstances, the contractibility over private benefits cannot be exploited, and ‘con-
structive ambiguity’ appears to be the only solution — where all defaulting debtors are bailed
out with probability 1 − πm, and the expected costs to creditors are reflected in sovereign
spreads as discussed earlier.
5 Institutional implications
If financing development by issuing bonds exposes emerging markets to excessive crisis, one
response is to limit the use of such debt instruments, Rodrik (1998). Some economists (e.g.
Stiglitz, 1998; Williamson 1995, 1999) have discussed the use of explicit inflow controls such
as those used in Chile intended to change the composition of flows in favour of longer term
investment rather than hot money.19 As Cordella (1998) points out, inflow controls which
succeed in shifting the structure of external financing may increase rather than decrease
the total volume of finance available for development: “taxes on short-term capital flows
by avoiding rational panics, can improve the expected returns of investments in emerging
markets, and thus increase the total volume of funds entering the country”, (p.6). In time
of crisis, however, the use of outflow controls may well be considered, both as a way of
conserving scarce foreign currency and of lowering domestic interest rates, Krugman (1998).
Rogoﬀ (1999, p.37-8) too has concluded that “the main problem with the present system
is that it contains strong biases towards debt finance”. To mitigate this bias, he argues for
a reversal of legal trends which have enabled creditors to enforce emerging markets debt
contracts in industrialised country courts — an argument for the restoration of sovereign
immunity.20 (It is acknowledged that this recommendation would lead to a contraction in
18“A private insurer would have strong incentives to renege the contract ex post (by not lending in the
event of bad news). Even if one assumes that the private insurer can be forced by a court to lend later, it
would be too late”, (Jeanne, 2001, p. 21).
19China attracts massive FDI inflows but strictly limits other forms of external finance.
20He repeats a recommendation made earlier, in Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1990), of “restricting countries’ ability
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the issuance of sovereign market bonds; and he observes that “instituting an international
bankruptcy court might be an alternative means to the same end”.)
The debate between John Taylor and Anne Krueger is, of course, premised on the
widespread continuation of bond finance for emerging markets countries without sovereign
immunity, as is our own discussion of the bankruptcy procedure — where we see an impor-
tant role for a rule-governed public agency to supply a commitment mechanism which makes
private payoﬀs accessible to the creditors ex post. It may be that the required control over
the ex post behaviour of the debtor could be achieved by oﬃcial “IMF conditionality” which
governs the actions of the sovereign whose debt is being restructured. (Applicants for debt
restructuring in the Paris Club are required as a matter of course to agree a programme
with the IMF before negotiation with creditors begin.) Thus IMF programmes could play
an important role in the international bankruptcy procedure described above.21 To check
moral hazard, of course, it would have to be known in advance that ‘conditionality’ would
be used to achieve the contractibility of private payoﬀs, i.e. the ‘rules’ need to be clear.
As an alternative to an SDRM, Collective Action Clauses have the attraction that they
are voluntary and market driven. As discussed earlier, however, there are two problems of
implementation, first the need to replace outstanding contracts, by swaps for example, and
second the need to aggregate across diﬀerent instruments, possibly by two-stage debt swaps,
see Table 6. Even supposing both can be solved, we believe that private bond contracts,
which are typically incomplete and involve creditors deciding what to do ex post, are unable
to deliver the required degree of protection and pre-commitment. Contracts incorporating
Collective Action Clauses do not prevent creditors from suing provided there is a blocking
minority in favour, Thomas (2002). Moreover, contracts with majority action action clauses
may fail to be renegotiation proof after a discovery phase in which the debtor is eﬀort
level is confirmed to be ‘bad’, as the debtor may renege on commitments to make ex-post
transfers. In other words, a hold-up problem may ensue as now the sovereign debtor has all
the bargaining power.22 Anticipating this, even with majority action clauses, creditors may
choose to terminate the project.
to waive sovereign immunity as a means of discouraging the mediation of debt contracts in industrialized
country courts” (p.38).
21How does this diﬀer from what happens with IMF “bail-outs” where private creditors who wish to exit
can do so using emergency oﬃcial funding and the IMF can impose conditionality so as to secure repayment?
(Jeanne and Zettlemeyer, 2000 provide evidence that oﬃcial funding is almost always repaid.) If this is known
ex ante, is it not as if creditors can secure commitment from the debtor? Yes but, given the possibility of
exit, they do not have the appropriate incentives: there is a problem of investor’s moral hazard where private
creditors fail to monitor. The bankruptcy procedures advocated by Anne Krueger explicitly prevent creditor
exit so as to avoid this problem.
22This situation arises in Kiyotaki and Moore’s (1997) model of credit cycles where the hold-up problem
can only be solved by the provision of collateral.
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Table 6: CACs and SDRM: Some key issues
Problems of
Implementation
Problems of
Operation
Collective Action Clauses
(voluntary, market driven)
(a) ‘Transition’
(b) ‘Aggregation’
Not litigation proof
Not renegotiation proof
SDRM
(involuntary, statutory)
Change of IMF Articles needed
Subject to geo-political &
ideological pressures
An SDRM backed by an international organisation, acting on behalf of the international
community, can solve such a hold-up problem by making the sovereign’s payoﬀs attachable
ex-post. In other words, our analysis of the reason for excessive crisis leads us to choose an
SDRM mechanism rather than private contracts. The implementation of the SDRM will,
however, require a super-majority vote to change the Articles in the IMF, something that
United States alone can block. Even assuming that the Articles can be changed, two delicate
issues need to be considered: whose private payoﬀs should be attached ex post; and to whom
should responsibility for overseeing such attachment be delegated?
The former is a matter of political economy. What if, in a crisis, those responsible can
exit, leaving debt for others to pay? In extreme cases, sovereign debtors may appeal to the
principle of ‘odious debt’ where a state may justifiably repudiate obligations incurred by
tyrants no longer in power (Birdsall and Williamson, 2002, and Kremer and Jayachandran,
2001). But assuming that this does not apply, is it eﬃcient or fair to punish those who could
not exit? It appears that in Argentina, for example, rich and well-informed citizens were
able to take their capital out of the country, thus avoiding the precipitate depreciation of
the peso.23 If rich private residents have made enormous capital gains in local currency by
exporting dollars from the country — now in default for lack of dollars to service its debt —
should they not participate in the cost of clearing up the ensuing chaos? Could the state
not demand payment of capital gains tax on the assets “marked to market”, for example;
or in extremis enforce repatriation in order to ensure the realisation of capital gains (and a
massive inflow of dollars)?
Even if one could think of such devices for making private payoﬀs contractible, what
public agency should implement them? Stiglitz (2002b) argues that, being dominated by
creditors’ interests and having adopted the ‘free market mantra of 1980s’, the IMF is not well
suited to devise and implement strategies for remedying capital market failures. In response
to financial crises in East Asia and Latin America, the organisation has nevertheless shown
itself willing to contemplate inflow controls and standstills as part of an SDRM — though
recommending outflow controls (and enforced repatriation) would not be consistent with its
normal practices and procedures.
23Smalhout (2001) noted that “the net external interest burden is actually quite modest, external debt
payments were $12.5 billion in 2000 or about 4% of GDP... But Argentines earned an estimated $6.4 billion
or just over 2 % of GDP.” In addition, there may have been private capital flight of $20 billion dollars in 2001
before the collapse of the peso.
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6 Conclusion
Calvo’s critique of the conventional wisdom — the Washington Consensus — is that market
failures in emerging market finance are far too important to be ignored.24 Tirole (2002, p.
ix-x) evidently shares the same perspective: his recent book on financial crises begins by
referring to the wide consensus that has emerged among economists that “capital account
liberalisation ... was unambiguously good. Good for the debtor countries, good for the
world economy” but goes on to note “that consensus have been shattered lately. A number
of capital account liberalizations have been followed by spectacular foreign exchange and
banking crises.” Like Tirole, we have focussed on the problems that can arise from contracts
which pose problems of creditor coordination. For simplicity we have assumed that creditors
all share the same information: but the information asymmetries stressed by Calvo would
(as the Appendix suggests) greatly enrich the analysis.
Solving creditor co-ordination problems in sovereign bond markets is, however, subject
to a moral hazard constraint: that debtors must retain the incentive to service their debts.
In a model of sovereign illiquidity with three Nash equilibria facing creditors, it is quite
likely that this incentive constraint rules out the no-crisis equilibrium, and either the mixed
strategy equilibrium or the pure strategy where all creditors quit will be selected, depending
on how severe the incentive problem is. In general, however, the termination probability is
higher than necessary for incentive purposes, i.e. there are too many crises.
How can bond markets be made more eﬃcient? We consider a bankruptcy procedure
involving temporary stay on creditor litigation and discovery process for determining the
underlying causes of default. A key element of the procedure is that when the sovereign
debtor in default is found to have made little or no eﬀort, its private payoﬀs will be reduced
ex post. To provide the right incentives, it is crucial that the mechanism for doing this should
have been agreed ex ante, as would be true if a ruled-governed public agency is involved.
Moreover, as we have argued, privately issued bond contracts are unlikely to achieve the same
result. We believe that the institutional approach to sovereign debt restructuring proposed
by the IMF is, in principle, capable of increasing bond market eﬃciency. What the rules
should be — and whether the IMF as currently constituted is the appropriate public agency
to implement them — are policy issues that remain to be discussed.
In future research, we intend to include the determination of sovereign spreads within
the analysis; and to combine creditor heterogeneity and insolvency shocks with debtor moral
hazard. Another useful extension would be to take account of the politics of decision-making
within a debtor country and how it interacts with the debt crises.
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7 Appendix: Extensions to the model
7.1 Robustness: The case of n creditors
In this section, we show that with n identical creditors, the equilibrium analysis of the
creditor coordination game is robust i.e. there continue to exist only two pure strategy
equilibria where all creditors either choose to quit or stay; and, in addition there is at least
one other mixed strategy equilibrium where each creditor quits with some probability q,
0 < q < 1.
The time line of events is as in Section 3. A sovereign is embarking on a bond-financed
investment project, costing K , which lasts only two periods. All finance is now supplied by
n identical creditors each of whom has invested b, and is promised a return of r in the first
period and (1+ r) in the second period. So long as resources available cover these payments
(i.e. cash flow in period 1 is greater than nrb and cash flow in period 2 is greater than
(1 + r)nb), all is well and the project will run to completion.
As before, there is an unanticipated, exogenous temporary shock (‘bad luck’) that lowers
the sovereign’s capacity to pay in period one the amount that is due to bond holders under
their contract. This is a liquidity shock so that the project net worth is unchanged, but, as
the failure to comply with the terms of the debt contract constitutes technical default, the
sovereign is exposed to the risk of a liquidity crisis if suﬃcient creditors seek to accelerate
their claims. Here, we assume that acceleration requires a minimum of 25% of the creditors
to act.
The co-ordination game facing the n creditors can then be specified as follows. Label
an individual creditor by i, i = 1, ..., n. Each creditor chooses an action ai ∈ {Quit, Stay}.
For an action profile a = (a1, ..., an), let Na,Q =

i : ai = Q

and Na,S =

i : ai = S

. Let
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N be the set of integers between n4 and n. Consider the function g˜ : N → ? such that
g˜(x) =min{(1 + r)b,Q/x} − L, x < n and g˜(n) = Q/n − L. Consider also the function
l˜ : N → ? such that l˜(n − x) =max{Q−(1+r)bxn−x , 0}, x < n. Remark that l˜(n − x) is well-
defined for all x ∈ N as we must have (1 + r)bn > Q: otherwise, the sovereign debtor would
have had enough resources to service her debt i.e. would not have defaulted in the first
place. Then the payoﬀs to creditors can be specified as follows. Suppose a is such that
x = #Na,Q ≥ n4 . Then, if ai = Q, the payoﬀ to creditor i is g˜(x), while if ai = S, the payoﬀ
to creditor i is l˜(x). Now suppose a is such that #Na,Q < n4 . Then, if a
i = Q, the payoﬀ to
creditor i is (1+r)b−L, while if ai = S, the payoﬀ to creditor i is (1+r)b, where L > 0 and
L > L. The legal costs, L, reflect the fact that an individual creditor, who unsuccessfully
tries to accelerate the project, pays a small legal fee for doing so but as the project is not
terminated obtains his continuation payoﬀ (1 + r)b.
As before, we find it convenient to work with normalized payoﬀs. Define the function
g : N → ? such that g(x) is decreasing in x, g(x) > 0 for x < n and g(n) = 0. Consider
also the function l : N → ? such that l(n − x) is decreasing in x and l(n − x) < 0 for all
x ∈ N . Suppose a is such that x = #Na,Q ≥ n4 . Then, if ai = Q, the payoﬀ to creditor
i is g(x) while if ai = S, the payoﬀ to creditor i is l(n − x). Now suppose a is such that
#Na,Q <
n
4 . Then, if a
i = Q, the payoﬀ to creditor i is 1 − γ while ai = S, the payoﬀ
to creditor i is 1 where γ > 0. As explained above, γ captures the fact that an individual
creditor who unsuccessfully tries to accelerate the project, pays a small but strictly positive
cost and therefore receives a continuation payoﬀ of 1 net of this cost.
As before, there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria, one where all creditors choose to
quit and another where all creditors choose to stay. There are no other pure strategy Nash
equilibria.
Next, we show that there is at least one other mixed strategy Nash equilibrium where all
n creditors randomly choose to quit with probability q, 0 < q < 1. Fix an individual creditor
i. Then, from the perspective of this creditor, there are n−1 creditors choosing to quit with
probability q and stay with probability 1− q. It follows that her payoﬀ from quitting will be
given by the expression
[
x+1≥n
4

n− 1
x

qx(1− q)n−1−xg(x+ 1) +

 [
x+1<n
4

n− 1
x

qx(1− q)n−1−x

 (1− γ)
while her payoﬀ from staying would be given by the expression
[
x+1≥n
4

n− 1
x

qx(1− q)n−1−xl(n− x) +
[
x+1<n
4

n− 1
x

qx(1− q)n−1−x.
At a mixed strategy equilibrium, the payoﬀ from quitting must be equal to the payoﬀ
from staying. By computing, it follows that this condition is equivalent to requiring that the
following polynomial f(q) has a zero in the open interval (0, 1) where f(q) is given by the
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expression

 [
x+1<n
4

n− 1
x

qx(1− q)n−1−x

 γ + r(q)
+
[
x+1≥n
4

n− 1
x

qx(1− q)n−1−x (l(n− x)− g(x+ 1))
where r(q) = 0 if n isn’t exactly divisible by 4 and is given by the expression

n− 1
n
4 − 1

q
n
4 (1− q) 34n−1
when n is exactly divisible by 4. Again, by computation, it follows that f(0) = γ > 0 while
f(1) = l(1)− g(n) < 0. As f(q) is a polynomial in q and therefore continuous in q, it follows
that there is a solution to f(q) = 0 at some q ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, there is at least one
mixed strategy equilibrium where all creditors randomly choose quit with some probability
q, 0 < q < 1.
7.2 Asymmetric information between creditors
Assume that after a sovereign default, there is incomplete information about whether the
adverse shock is temporary or permanent i.e. whether the underlying problem is one of
liquidity or insolvency. There are two states of the world ω ∈ {P, T} where P denotes
a permanent shock which has an irreversible eﬀect on the debtors net worth and on the
continuation payoﬀ of the creditors and T denotes a temporary shock which only has a no
eﬀect on debtors net worth and nor on the continuation payoﬀ of the creditors. Nature
selects one of these two states of the world according to the prior probability distribution
{π, 1− π}. Once the state of world nature is chosen, each player receives a signal σi ∈ {P, T}
which is privately observed by each individual creditor and independently distributed across
creditors with p = Pr(σi = ω|ω) > 12 , for i = 1, 2 and ω = P, T . Payoﬀs depend upon state
of nature and on creditor’s action as shown in the table below.
Table 7: State dependent payoﬀs
a) When ω = P the payoﬀ matrix is
Actions 2 QUITS 2 STAYS
1 QUITS 0 0 ε δ
1 STAYS δ ε −K −K
b) When ω = T the payoﬀ matrix is
Actions 2 QUITS 2 STAYS
1 QUITS 0 0 ε δ
1 STAYS δ ε K K
A strategy for a creditor is a map from his signals to actions. We focus on Bayesian
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equilibrium strategy profiles.
We remark that the strategy profile where both creditors quit whatever their signal is
always a pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium: given that the other creditor always quits,
quitting is a dominant action for each individual creditor.
However, under certain restrictions on parameters, another pure strategy Bayesian equi-
librium exists, namely one where each creditor chooses to quit if σi = P and stays if σi = T .
Although at first sight this Bayesian equilibrium is appealing, as we show later in this sub-
section, it is also ex-ante ineﬃcient. Conditional on a individual creditor observing some
signal, let s denote the probability that the other creditor observes the same signal. Note
that s = p2 + (1 − p)2.25 For any individual creditor, conditional on σi = P, the expected
payoﬀ from quitting is 0 + (1 − s)ε > 0 which is always greater than the expected payoﬀ
from staying, sδ − (1− s)K (1− 2p) < 0 as p > 12 . For any individual creditor, conditional
on σi = T, the expected payoﬀ from quitting is sε while the expected payoﬀ from staying
is (1 − s)δ + sK(2p − 1). For staying to be a best response, we need the condition that
sε ≤ (1− s)δ+ sK(2p−1), or equivalently |δ|ε+|δ|+K(2p−1) ≤ s. Remark that s is a measure of
the correlation of the signals privately observed by individual creditors and |δ| is a measure
of the disadvantage of being the second mover in the creditor grab race. The inequality
|δ|
ε+|δ|+K(2p−1) ≤ s can be now be interpreted as saying that the more costly it is to be the
second mover in the creditor grab race, the more coorelated the privately observed signals
have to be across creditors for the above strategy profile to be a Bayesian equilibrium.
In a first best situation, where the state of the world is common knowledge, termination
should occur only when the shock is permanent, hence the project is terminated with prob-
ability π. In the Bayesian equilibrium where both creditors withdraw irrespective of their
signal, however, the probability of project termination is one. In the Bayesian equilibrium
where each creditor chooses to quit if σi = P and to stay if σi = T , the probability of
termination is (1 − π) + p2 + 2p(1 − p) − 2p(1 − π). Remark that if p = 1, this expression
is equal to π. By computation, it can be confirmed that the derivative of this expression
is 2(π − p). When, π > p, there is excessive project termination relative to the first best,
while if π < p there is too little project termination relative to first-best. It follows that the
Bayesian equilibrium randomisation is almost always ineﬃcient relative to first best.
Now, consider a direct revelation mechanism where the creditors announce their signals to
the mechanism designer and the mechanism designer terminates the project with probability
one if both creditors announce bad signal; terminates the project with some exogenous
probability x if one creditor announces a good signal and another creditor announces the
bad signal; and continues the project with probability one if both creditors announce the
good signal. The associated probability of termination is (1−π)+p2+2xp(1−p)−2p(1−π).
25We can derive this as follows:
s = Pr(σi = ω|σj = ω)
= Pr(σi = ω,ω) Pr(ω|σj = ω)
+Pr(σi = ω,ω) Pr(ω|σj = ω)
= p2 + (1− p)2.
31
It follows that by choosing x appropriately, a direct revelation mechanism can always do at
least as well as a Bayesian equilibrium and in some cases i.e. π > p, it can do strictly better.
Observe that this mechanism is incentive-compatible as truth-telling is a weakly dominant
strategy for each creditor. We summarize this discussion by the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The Bayesian equilibrium project termination is almost always ineﬃcient
relative to first best. Moreover, a direct revelation mechanism does better.
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